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Summary
In this paper, we are investigating the causes of slow and ineffi  cient transition in BiH 
as well as possibilities for its improvement. In the past seventeen years, the international 
community has been the strongest integrative power of BiH. Although democratization 
and market economy are generally emphasized as peace strengthening factors, the market 
has not succeeded in absorbing resources nor has it provided economic self-sustainability, 
and democracy has not established institutions to match economic, social and political 
problems in BiH. Th is has led to the failure of the fundamental concept of transition set by 
the international community. Th e international community should demonstrate its readi-
ness to let domestic politicians take responsibility for the current state of aff airs in BiH. 
Only when domestic politicians have completely taken over responsibility can they become 
aware of all advantages and all shortcomings of the relationships in BiH established by the 
Dayton Accord and establish the needed political consensus about the future of BiH. Th is 
consensus is the imperative precondition for achieving the functionality of BiH, redraft ing 
the Constitution, establishing a new economic system, conducting a new cycle of economic 
reforms and accelerating transition.   
Key words: transition, market economy, democratization, economic reforms, new 
economic system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Compared with the postwar circumstances, initial changes towards the estab-
lishment of a market economy and democratic institutions have been made in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) in the past sixteen years. Assessments of BiH’s postwar de-
velopment, made by the academic community and politicians, have been unbalanced, 
and sometimes contradictory and confusing (Fischer, 2006). By comparing diff erent 
indicators for transition countries, it is easy to notice that transition in BiH has been 
slower in almost all fi elds. What causes most concern is the slow progress in the 
improvement of public administration, the elimination of systemic corruption, the 
increase in effi  ciency of macroeconomic policy, the improvement of microeconom-
ic policy, the establishment of rule of law and spreading economic freedoms (Free-
dom House, 2011). Th erefore, the following question is justifi able: Why has BiH not 
achieved better results in the economic sphere, especially because, as a small transi-
tion country, it has been privileged to receive signifi cant international economic and 
technical aid? Has the Dayton Peace Accord2 been economically effi  cient in the past 
17 years? Has the wave of transition only “splashed against” BiH in passing at the end 
of the transition paradigm (Carothers, 2002)? Can transition in BiH be accelerated 
and improved?
Transition in BiH, initiated in late 1980’s, was thwarted by the war that was 
the result of disintegration of the socialist Yugoslavia. Th e privatization process was 
stopped and social property was “turned into state-owned”. However, the freedom 
of entrepreneurship, established in late 1980’s, was not suspended. For the duration 
of the war (1992-1995), the administrative and political control of the economy was 
stepped up. When the war ended (in November 1995), BiH demonstrated an empow-
ered concept of state entrepreneurship established on the grounds of the totality of 
state-owned property in enterprises and banks, and, frequently, with non-transpar-
ent ties with private companies which were most developed in the trade and service 
sectors. State ownership became the basis for bureaucratic and voluntaristic manage-
ment of the economy, politicization and socialization of economic relations, politi-
cal and bureaucratic reapportionment between the economy and the state as well as 
within the economy, ineffi  ciency in using resources, unattractiveness for expanding 
the economic partnership, limiting entrepreneurial and economic freedoms and so 
on. Resources were seized and isolated from the impact of the market system by na-
tional bureaucracies, group-ownership interests, corrupted political lobbies, criminal 
cartels and the inertia of the socialist system (Tomaš, 2008). In connection with this, 
both market and regulatory institutions were insuffi  ciently developed, and were sub-
ordinated to the interests of resource controlling centers.
2 Th e General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more recognized in public as the 
Dayton Peace Accord. It was signed in the Wright Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, American state 
of Ohio, on 21st November 1995. Th e Accord was offi  cially signed in Paris, on 14th December 1995. Its 
signing formally ended the war waged in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995). 
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Dayton Peace Accord was an eff ort to establish the fundamental parameters 
of the transition process in BiH and, on that basis, to eliminate, isolate or transform 
contradictions that had provoked the war. It includes the establishment of a market 
economy with a uniform BiH market. Th is is refl ected throughout the following pro-
visions: the freedom of movement of people, capital, goods and services (Article 1 of 
the Constitution); uniform currency and uniform monetary policy (Article 7 of the 
Constitution); centralized foreign trade policy (Article 3 of the Constitution); central-
ized customs policy (Article 3 of the Constitution); centralized balance of payments 
(Article 3 of the Constitution)3.
..
Exposed to strong pressures made by the international community, BiH for-
mally opted for the development of modern market institutions, privatization and 
ownership protection, as well as the execution of contractual obligations. It also opted 
for accepting risks of doing business, business morale and discipline. Th e goal was to 
accelerate movement towards a market economy through (WB, EC&EBRD, 1996): (a) 
the establishment of a stimulating business environment for existing private busi-
nesses and new ones, (b) the privatization of state capital in enterprises and banks, (c) 
the development of a disciplined and competitive fi nancial sector, and (d) the liberali-
zation of the market and opening up to economic cooperation and integrations.
Irrespective of any diff erences in BiH, a consensus has been established that 
market economy and strong private sector are preconditions for a fast economic re-
covery and continuous growth. Together with signifi cant international support, BiH 
has made progress in all fi elds in the past 17 years. However, progress is far below 
expectations of the population and their real needs.
2. UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS OF TRANSITION IN 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BiH’s economy is burdened with serious structural problems in the economy 
and the lack of strategy and policy of using resources, which is directly manifested in 
the creation of a small social product, very low effi  ciency in using resources and an 
uneconomic valuation of the contribution of resources to GDP generation. Th e net 
labor price4 is low; however, by means of relatively high tax and salary contributions 
rates5, it has artifi cially been raised to a higher level in relation to labor demand and 
off er on the market. Because of diff erences in their social, pension and educational 
3 Th e Dayton Peace Accord includes the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as its integral part, which 
is not a usual practice in international peace accords. 
4 Th e average net salary in BiH paid in December 2012 was 831 KM (425 Euros) (Source: Th e Agency for 
Statistics of B&H, Communiqué No. 12, as of 21th February 2013).
5 In the BiH Federation, the total rate of the contribution to the gross salary is 41.5%, and in the Republic 
of Srpska 33%. 
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systems, the entities6 have not established a uniform labor market (Stojanov, 2009:16). 
Unemployment is high.7 Salaries are increasing faster than labor productivity. Th e 
real interest rate on loans is higher than in the eurozone, loan insurances are fre-
quently more rigorous, and borrowing procedures are more complicated… Th e prices 
and costs of doing business in BiH are growing faster than in the eurozone although 
the convertible mark is fi xedly pegged to the euro.8 Th e Central Bank of BiH func-
tions as the currency board9, providing stable prices. However, in conditions of a high 
and continuous defi cit in the balance of payments, the real foreign exchange rate of 
the domestic currency is overestimated and discourages export. Trade liberalization, 
without the implementation of appropriate regulations and incentives for domestic 
production, has additionally destroyed domestic production and degraded available 
resources. Th e subsistence of the population has become dependent on imports. Trade 
balance defi cit has a high share in GDP10, which makes social and economic sustain-
ability increasingly dependent on imports. Th e balance of payments current account 
defi cit is high11. Poverty rate is one of the highest in South-East Europe,12 and chances 
of eliminating poverty are very small. Th e purchasing power of the population in BiH 
represents no more than just around 30% of the European Union’s average. Public 
spending has a high share in total GDP.13 Public debt is growing at a quick pace14. Net 
direct foreign investments in BiH are in a continuous fall15, thus infl uencing reduced 
spending. Th ere are 90 pensioners and 77 unemployed persons for every 100 employed 
6 Th e Dayton Peace Accord established a new political and legal organization of BiH. BiH kept the status of 
an internationally acknowledged state comprising two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(51% of the territory), and the Republic of Srpska (49% of the territory).
7 In December 2011, the number of unemployed persons in BiH was 536,728. In November 2011, the 
unemployment rate in BiH, according to the ILO defi nition, was 27.6%. (Source: Survey on Workforce, 
Th ematic Bulletin No. 10, Agency for Statistics of B&H, p. 25).
8 Th e annual infl ation rate in BiH in 2011 was 3.1%, and in the Euro zone 2.7%. (Source: Communiqué of 
the Agency for Statistics of BiH, No. 12, 25th January 2012, and Euroindicators 30/2012, Eurostat, 29th 
February 2012). 
9 Th e “convertible mark” domestic currency is legally bound to the euro at a fi xed rate: 1 euro = 1.95583 
convertible marks.
10 A high trade balance defi cit has been maintained throughout BiH’s independence. In late 2011, the trade 
balance defi cit was -7.3 billion KM or around 28.9% of GDP. However, because of a decrease in spending, 
imports contracted. (Source: Statistics of Commodity Exchange with Foreign Countries, Communiqué 
No. 12, 25th January 2012, Agency for Statistics of BiH).  
11 Because of reduction in imports and spending under the infl uence of the crisis, there is a decrease in the 
relative signifi cance of the current account defi cit. In 2008, the current account defi cit represented 14.4% 
of GDP, and in 2011, it was around 5.5%. (IMF Country Report No. 10/348).
12 Th ere are no offi  cial assessments of the extent of poverty in BiH. According to the assessments of the 
World Bank for 2011, 18% of BiH’s population are below the poverty line (less than 2.5 US$ per day), and 
even 48% of the population are on the brim of poverty (between 2.5 and 5 US$).
13 Th e consolidated public expenses of BiH represent on average around 50% of the gross domestic product in the 
time period from 2008 to 2011. According to the fi ndings of the IMF, the budget of the general government of BiH 
generated a defi cit of around 4.5% of the gross domestic product in 2011 (IMF Country Report No. 10/348).
14 According to the estimation of the IMF, the public debt of BiH in the year 2012 will reach 60% of GDP, 
whereas it was 48% in 2008. (IMF Country Report No. 10/348).
15 Th e value of  net direct foreign investments in BiH was 12.94% of GDP in 2007, only to fall to only 0.1% 
of GDP in 2010 (Financial Sector Benchmarking System, Bosnia and Herzegovina High Level Financial Sector 
Overview, Partners for Financial Stability, October 2011).
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workers. Th e GDP per capita was 3392 euro in 2011, and, according to the purchasing 
power parity, it is the lowest in South-East Europe. Social policy has been imposed on 
enterprises as a parameter of doing business, which is not typical for a large number 
of countries. Th is signifi cantly decreases the competitiveness of an enterprise. 
During the war, and partly aft er the war, the rule of law was devastated in BiH. 
It is obvious that the authorities did not want to consolidate the rule of law, because 
of their own interests. Because of its ineffi  ciency, BiH is widely perceived as a country 
of corruption, crime, gray economy, unprotected economic freedoms, human rights 
breaches, limitations to the freedom of the media.
Th e majority of the reform processes in BiH were initiated, implemented and 
fi nanced by diff erent international organizations. Also, a lot of reform processes were 
created in order to fulfi ll the conditions for joining CEFTA, the EU and NATO. Th ere is 
almost no authentic reform initiated and implemented by the BiH authorities. Th e inter-
national community has a vast, if not decisive, infl uence on political and economic issues 
in BiH (Donais and Pickel, 2003:6). Such a manner of reforming the economic and social 
system in BiH has not created suffi  cient responsibility on the part of domestic authorities 
for the implementation of reforms and monitoring their results. Also, those processes 
have oft en lacked harmonized solutions and coordinated implementation, thus bringing 
into surface unequal conditions in the functioning of the economy and implementa-
tion of human rights. BiH had one of the most expensive transition processes. However, 
the assessment of relevant international institutions is that the reached level of reform 
implementation in the economy and society is still not satisfactory to term its transition 
successful. According to the ease of conducting business operations, BiH was ranked 
125th country out of 183 in 2012 (WB&IFC, 2011). According to the value of the economic 
freedom index in 2012, BiH is the 104th country among 184, and belongs to the group of 
countries with a prevalently limited economic freedom (Th e Heritage Foundation, 2011). 
In 2011-2012, according to the global competitiveness index, BiH was ranked 100th coun-
try among 142 (World Economic Forum, 2011). In late 2011, the international agency 
Standard & Poor’s lowered BiH’s sovereign credit rating from “B+” to “B” with a nega-
tive outlook. BiH also has the “B2” credit rating with negative prospects, according to 
Moody’s Investors Service. Out of 183 analyzed countries, BiH was 91st according to the 
corruption perception index (Transparency International’s, 2011). For years, it has been 
a country with the highest corruption perception in South-East Europe.
In all countries of the Western Balkans, transition has been slow. According to 
some economists, it has been very unsuccessful (B. Horvat, 2002; M. Kovačević, 2011). 
According to respectable world institutions engaged in researching the rank of coun-
tries as per diff erent criteria and whose results serve as guidance for foreign investors, 
BiH frequently has the worst rank among the countries of the Western Balkans16, 
which unambiguously confi rms its unsuccessful, slow and very costly transition.
16 For example: Doing Business in a more transparent world 2012, Th e World Bank and IFC,  2011; Th e Global 
Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, World Economics Forum, 2011;  Highlights of the 2012 Index of Eco-
nomic Freedoms, Th e Heritage Foundation, 2011;  Nations in Transit 2011, Freedom House, 2011, Credit 
Rating of BiH, Standard and Poor’s 2011; Moody’s Investors Service 2011.
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Slow and inconsistent reforms reduce the effi  ciency of using available resourc-
es, the infl ow of foreign capital and the transfer of modern technology. Without these, 
there is no improved competitiveness, increase in employment, nor improvement in 
standard. BiH is one of the rare transition countries that have still not reached the 
real level of the GDP of 199017. Its GDP in 2011 represented around 80% of the GDP 
expressed in prices in 1990. In the fi rst fi ve years since the beginning of transition, the 
majority of transition countries reached the GDP level they had prior to transition.
Th e spreading of the global economic crisis onto BiH threatens its already 
modest results of transition. Th e authorities, the business, the union and the non-gov-
ernment sector have not responded to the appearance of the crisis in a manner similar 
groups responded to it in other countries. Unfortunately, BiH has been experiencing 
diff erent forms of the crisis for years now. Population here is used to hard life, un-
certainty, low standard, isolation, political instability, bad quality of public services, 
poor infrastructure, corruption, ineffi  ciency of the rule of law, breach of rights, limi-
tation of freedoms, loss of property, loss of jobs… Under the impact of these factors 
for many years, the motivation of ordinary people has importantly modifi ed when 
compared to the motivation of people in developed western countries hit by the crisis. 
Because of that, reactions to the expansion of the crisis have been of weaker intensity 
here. In BiH, the crisis has become an ambience people live in, an ambience creating 
one’s view of the world, the reforms and the future.
3. CAUSES OF SLOW AND INEFFICIENT TRANSITION IN 
BIH
3.1. Limitations to institutional framework for transition in BiH
Th e development of BiH in the postwar period has pointed to an interdepend-
ent and simultaneous conduct of several forms of transition: (1) from socialism into 
capitalism; (2) from the war economy into the market one; (3) from totalitarianism 
into democracy; (4) from war exclusiveness into tolerance. Th e Dayton Accord en-
sured the institutional framework for making decisions on key issues regarding the 
functioning and development of BiH. However, the inertia of the confl ict caused the 
consensus about fundamental reform projects to be reached very slowly. Critics of the 
establishment of two entities in BiH accused the Dayton Accord of being an unsat-
isfactory framework for the country’s transition and progress. According to political 
options aspiring to the centralization and unitarianism of the country, the institu-
tional framework produced by the Dayton Accord is insuffi  cient and dysfunctional. 
At the same time, they forget that it was exactly the creation of entities that was the 
most signifi cant argument for establishing and maintaining peace in BiH. “…By cre-
ating new states or autonomous regions - has been more successful in stopping ethnic 
civil wars than has the strategy of attempting eff orts to reconcile warring parties un-
17 IMF - World Economic Outlook, October 2010, United Nations Statistics Division – National Accounts 
Statistics database
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der a common state” (Paris, 1997: 80). Also, it is frequently forgotten that the Dayton 
Accord stipulates that the entities can reach an agreement on anything not directly 
written down in the Accord (Article III of the Constitution of BiH). According to the 
institutional framework designed by the Dayton Accord, everything can be changed 
in BiH, including the Accord itself, but neither nation, or entity, can impose their 
own will on the other nation or entity. Th at formula has established and strengthened 
peace in BiH. 
Th e institutional setup created by the Dayton Accord in BiH prescribes demo-
cratic relations in the society and a market economy in doing business. Unfortunately, 
in a country such as BiH, the development of democratic and market institutions has 
been long and hard. Th e implementation of the Dayton Accord in the past 17 years 
has been least effi  cient in the economic fi eld. Th e use of the Dayton Accord in the 
economic sphere was not an appropriate tool for transition in BiH. Th ere are relevant 
explanations for this. 
3.1.1. Dayton Accord almost does not have an economic dimension
Th e Dayton Accord mentions only a few points of reference of the basic ele-
ments of the economic system, which have not been suffi  cient to inspire the authori-
ties in BiH to reach a consensus about a modern economic system. In the economic 
fi eld, BiH had very diffi  cult tasks to accomplish in the postwar period:
3.1.2. Reconstruction of demolished infrastructure and devastated 
production capacities, as precondition for economic sustainability 
Th anks to international fi nancial aid and favorable loans, best results have 
been achieved in the reconstruction of infrastructure (electric power supplies, water 
supplies, reconstruction of roads, bridges, telecommunications, and communal infra-
structure in settlements). Enterprises and banks were left  to the market, i.e. they were 
about to be renewed and brought back to function aft er privatization. Privatization 
was justifi ed by the need to depoliticize economic life and establish the foundations 
of economic recovery and growth. However, it was soon realized that in BiH the pri-
vatization process “failed on both counts” (Donais, 2002: 2). Unfortunately, the slow, 
bureaucratic and criminalized process of privatization was not effi  cient and has not 
yet been brought to an end. A package of transition measures almost identical to the 
one off ered to other transitions countries was applied to the reconstruction and post-
war development of BiH (WB, EC&EBRD, 1996). WB and IMF proposed structural 
changes starting from a presumption that western models of market economy and 
democracy were optimal, and that they complemented each other (Paris, 1997:62). 
On the basis of the fi rst experiences in postwar reconstruction, doubts emerged that 
a conceptual approach to reconstruction was an inadequate response to economic 
problems originating in the socialist and war past (Fischer, 2006: 447) or that it was 
wrong as well  (Stojanov, 2001).
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3.1.3. Transition to market economy
In order to conduct a successful transition in a country such as BiH, which, 
simultaneously with transition, had to solve problems of postwar reconstruction, politi-
cal integration and international reconciliation problems, much stronger institutions 
had to have been established in BiH instead of the existing ones. Because of the lack of 
political unity, the strong inertia of socialism and the war economy, and substantially 
because of the international community’s obtrusiveness, BiH was not capable of defi n-
ing a consistent model to pursue through transition. Only partly was the model deter-
mined by the Dayton Accord. It was unclearly interpreted, and to a large extent, it was 
upgraded through the postwar infl uence of the international community. International 
organizations in BiH applied the model of economic transition derived from the neolib-
eral ideology of aggressive capitalism (Pugh, 2005). It used to be believed that BiH was 
crying out for a market economy and that free entrepreneurship would very soon soft en 
the majority of contradictions in BiH. A uniform market, uniform currency and the 
freedom of entrepreneurship, accompanied by a strong fi nancial support received from 
the international community, should have led to economic integration and progress 
of the country. “Th e equation “Democratization + Market Economy = Peace”, which 
has been the guiding principle of international intervention, did not match Bosnian 
reality“(Fischer, 2006: 447). BiH’s experience demonstrated that political divisions in 
the country were much deeper than it had been previously believed, and that the con-
sensus about the need of transition to a market economy and a democratic society was 
not the highest priority of political structures in the country.
3.1.4. Necessity of structural changes 
Change in economic structure, adoption of a new technology, change in the 
entrepreneurial concept and increase in the competitiveness of domestic enterprises 
are preconditions for economic development and economic sustainability of BiH. In 
BiH, there was no political will to achieve a consensus about the institutional frame-
work and policy of structural changes. Th erefore, there is no single institution in 
BiH which could take the responsibility for structural adjustments in the economy. 
Th is is left  to spontaneous fl ows in the market. However, ineffi  cient privatization, 
poorly managed system of foreign investments, undefi ned economic system, inad-
equate foreign-trade policy and lack of vision of development led to the collapse of 
entire areas of production. Spontaneous structural adjustments proved to be the most 
expensive form of adaptation, accompanied by serious consequences in social and 
political spheres.  
3.1.5. Focal point of Dayton Accord was not economic but political 
effi  ciency 
Establishment of peace was expected to encourage domestic authorities to pre-
cipitate building of a democratic system with a strong economy founded on the mar-
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ket. Th is expectation has not been achieved. Th e country has been preoccupied with 
dealing with the past for the last 17 years. At the same time, it has lost its future. Th e 
population is still obsessed with fear and interethnic mistrust, which is manifested 
in supporting radical nationalists in the elections (Fischer, 2006: 442). Th e predomi-
nant method of functioning of BiH in the past 17 years has on the one hand been the 
strong will and police coercion of international peace forces, and attractive economic 
aid on the other. Many a reform solution has been subordinated to the maintenance of 
peace and campaigns related to peace reinforcement (return of refugees, regaining the 
possession of property and so on), which has been unfavorable for economic consist-
ency and effi  ciency. International economic aid should have compensated for lower 
effi  ciency and thus should have made the system sustainable in its entirety. However, 
institutional and entrepreneurial initiative for the development of the economy failed 
to occur. Th erefore, the reduction in international aid in recent years has increasingly 
been indicative of the fact that economic sustainability of BiH is a precondition for its 
entire sustainability as a country.
3.1.6. Very important role of the international community 
Th e important role of international institutions based in BiH, oft en with ar-
bitrary and supervisory authorizations, has led to its lagging behind in development 
and to the passivity of domestic institutions. It is oft en the case that the attitude of 
the international community regarding a problem in BiH is more important than the 
interest and potential agreed upon attitude of domestic interested parties. Th e Offi  ce 
of the High Representative (OHR)18 for BiH has become almost the highest legislative 
and judicial authority in BiH because the OHR has been empowered to impose laws 
and, without any legal proceeding whatsoever, suspend democratically elected repre-
sentatives of the citizens if he has assessed that their behavior represents an obstacle 
to the implementation of the Dayton Accord. In such circumstances, elected political 
leaders have felt greater responsibility towards the OHR than towards the citizens. 
Th erefore, a special form of moral hazard has been introduced to the political system 
of BiH. Elected politicians have not taken responsibility for what is going on in the 
country, making excuses and claiming that they have been limited in doing so by the 
international community. Th is has additionally slowed down the process of reaching 
a consensus about important issues and slowed down creating necessary institutions 
and establishing the needed level of their effi  ciency.
Th e slow and ineffi  cient transition in BiH is not exclusively the consequence 
of institutional limitations caused by the implementation of the Dayton Peace Ac-
cord. BiH’s economy is burdened by its heritage of socialism and war. Postwar inef-
fi ciency of the economy and institutions in the implementation of reforms should just 
be added to these factors..
18 Th e OHR is an international ad hoc body established by the Dayton Accord, with a mandate to supervise 
the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Accord. 
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3.2. Burdensome economic heritage and inconsistent reforms
3.2.1. Economic structure was formed by using bureaucratic and not 
market methods
In the economic structure of BiH, as opposed to other parts of former Yugosla-
via, it is possible to recognize traces of bureaucratic modeling of the economic struc-
ture. Th is process lasted for almost half a century and employed the largest part of 
resources found on the territory of BiH. It was replaced by the war economy formed 
by three national entities. In order to enable the free market to remodel the economic 
structure of BiH, it is necessary to eliminate the heritage of socialism and war, as 
well as to have institutions strong enough to establish and protect the freedom of the 
market.
3.2.2. War consequences are much more serious than previously considered 
Th e condition of resources in BiH and possibilities for their market utilization 
is much worse than it was thought immediately aft er the war. Human and material 
resources were damaged immeasurably and invisibly. Figures cannot provide us with 
the real state of aff airs. A large number of people went through diff erent traumas, and 
their capabilities cannot be compared with those before the war. A large number of 
refugees from BiH, primarily highly educated ones, have stayed in developed coun-
tries permanently because of better living conditions, a more advanced system of 
education and a more substantial social aid (Eastmond, 2006).  Th e changed political 
structure of the country and the change in territorial jurisdiction of institutions had 
an impact on the change in the organization and business contacts of a large number 
of enterprises. Th e disintegration of the Yugoslav market had serious consequences 
for the economy of BiH. Technological lagging behind of BiH’s economy was more 
prominent when compared to other transition countries, and this reinforced the lag-
ging behind of labor productivity and the loss of market.
3.2.3. BiH is not fully politically stable
Although the Dayton Peace Accord was effi  cient in stopping the war, the in-
stitutions established by the Accord did not ensure full political stability. Based on 
political requests frequently presented on diff erent sides in BiH, it can be concluded 
that the opposed war goals of the national communities did not disappear once the 
peace accord was concluded. To the contrary, attempts were made to achieve these 
goals by means of other methods. Th is primarily refers to political forces leading 
the nations and stressing their national interests in the past war. Th ey are still active 
in the political life of BiH and present themselves as legitimate representatives of 
national interests in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord as well as part-
ners of the international community in the process. To justify their raison d’être, na-
tional political structures frequently reaffi  rm diff erent theses regarding endangered 
national interests, the unequal position of the nations in BiH, the injustices inherent 
109
POSLOVNA IZVRSNOST ZAGREB, GOD. VII (2013) BR. 1 Tomaπ R.: Causes of slow and inefficient transition of economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina...
in the Dayton Peace Treaty and similar issues. All this contributes to political in-
stability of relations in BiH and slows down the development of democratic institu-
tions. Th e Dayton Peace Accord was a good political basis to stop the war. However, 
it has become evident that a suffi  ciently strong political will that would establish an 
institutional framework representing a higher level of political stability necessary as 
a general framework for the development of the economy and a democratic society 
simply does not exist. Exactly for this reason there are centralistic, hegemonic, sepa-
ratist and nationalist political tendencies in BiH. Th eir emergence brings BiH back to 
the beginning: the key elements of its political and legal constitution and existence 
are brought into question. Th e worst damage generated by such conditions is evident 
in the sphere of economy.
3.2.4. Formal reform of the society 
A plethora of reforms have been initiated in BiH. Unfortunately, international 
institutions have been the most frequent initiators of reform and proposal-makers for 
reform projects. Such reforms have oft en been conducted partially without necessary 
coordination and synchronization, and as a precondition for the approval of fi nancial 
aid. Also, “imposition of solutions” of the international community by the OHR in 
BiH has been a signifi cant factor in conducting reforms. Such solutions, especially in 
the economic sphere, have not brought about needed motivation with investors, espe-
cially foreign. Domestic institutions have frequently attempted reforms only formally 
and in a superfi cial manner. Th ey have most frequently reformed the system only to 
the point directly required by the international community. Because of this, the sys-
tem would very oft en continue to function as it did before in a number of fi elds, and 
it would already be certain that a new cycle of reforms would need to be conducted in 
order to enable BiH to develop. 
3.2.5. Ineffi  cient and expensive government structure has been established
In order to reconcile political contradictions, a government structure was es-
tablished, and it was spending a big portion of the domestic product, especially in 
the Federation of BiH, at the same time off ering a very modest range of public serv-
ices and goods. Unfortunately, reforming such a government structure is a very slow 
process with a lot of political limitations, while consumption of the institutions con-
tinued to grow. Th e high price of political compromise in BiH is paid by its citizens. 
About one half of the GDP is spent by BiH’s public institutions. BiH has become the 
most bureaucratized country in South-East Europe, spending around 13% of its GDP 
only for the purpose of salaries paid to those employed in the administration (WB, 
2012). Th e state level of government has no responsibility at all for the development 
of the country or social conditions in it. Entities are in charge of these issues. Th e 
state budget is fi xed and has priority in being fi nanced from the uniform account of 
public incomes. Th erefore, the state budget is not exposed to the risk of deteriora-
tion of economic conditions in the country and the reduced possibility of collecting 
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public income. Because of this form of fi nancing the state budget, yet another form of 
moral hazard and fi scal paradox has made its way to BiH. Th e security of income for 
the state budget frees the state institutions and those employed in them from being 
responsible for the condition in the country. On the other hand, the entities have the 
entire public income of the country at their disposal but only have an overall respon-
sibility for development and the social condition.
3.2.6. Broadly corrupted society
During the war and the postwar period, BiH has become a territory of illegal 
trade of many goods, including traffi  cking. Th e specifi city of the war in BiH, where 
national armies had blocked supplies of elementary foodstuff s needed for the subsist-
ence of cities and entire regions, is that “national businessmen” emerged, and they be-
came “heroes” because they succeeded in providing large amounts of goods in diffi  cult 
times. Of course, prices were several times higher than ordinary market prices. Th is is 
how those privileged “suppliers” acquired their wealth. In very diffi  cult times they had 
money, and money in their hands meant power. War entrepreneurs adapted themselves 
well to the post-Dayton time period (Pugh and Cooper, 2004:146). Th ey became spon-
sors, donors and “benefactors” of many institutions, including political parties as well. 
To live without them playing a role seemed impossible. As trade became more liberal-
ized in the postwar period, the prices of the war period decreased for a large number 
of goods. At the same time, various cartels and lobbies for trading defi cient goods were 
established and the corrupted structure of government was brought to light. High prof-
its were generated thanks to customs duties and tax evasion, rather than because of high 
productivity (Tomaš, 2010). Th e “start-up funds” of the new elite were created during 
the war. However, wealth continued to accumulate but it was not necessarily dependent 
on the continuation of the war (Andreas, 2009:41). Corrupted politicians enabled war 
profi teers to continue to accumulate their wealth in peace as well.
3.2.7. Highest portion of resources under control of a small number of 
people
Th e war accumulation of capital, corrupted authorities, economic and political 
lobbies – they all led to the establishment of direct or indirect control over the largest 
portion of resources by a relatively small number of people (Tomaš, 2004). Th is con-
trol limited the effi  ciency of reforms and discouraged foreign investors from coming 
to the country. Various lobbies and cartels became stronger than state institutions. 
Frequently, their will was crucial for the effi  ciency of a measure introduced by the 
authorities. In the same manner, either by accident or on purpose, certain decisions 
reached by the authorities favored them. Unfortunately, a large number of people 
controlling the resources did not gain control through normal market competition 
but through institutional privileges, control of the corrupted authorities and crimi-
nal acts. Th ey were not capable of developing competitiveness and were incapable of 
being good partners to foreign investors. Th eir activities and success would be un-
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imaginable in normal market conditions and a country governed by the rule of law. 
A Bosnian variant of “bandit capitalism” was established. Both they and politicians 
under their control did not need a better system. In a normally arranged economic 
system, they would go bankrupt under the pressure of the competition, and their 
political partners would be defeated in a normal democratic system. Martina Fischer 
was right to notice that the war did not only produce “losers” but also “winners” who 
developed an interest in the continuation of the confl ict (Fischer, 2006: 450). 
3.2.8. Widely present “gray economy”
Low standard of living of the population, corrupted authorities and high un-
employment rate has had an impact on the creation of the sector of “gray economy”. 
Because of stunted development and low economic effi  ciency, the “gray economy” 
has become a “social program”. Avoiding any responsibility for the socio-economic 
conditions and absence of economic development, the authorities accepted the “gray 
economy” as a necessity and became very tolerant to its expansion. Of course, the 
“gray economy” is very “effi  cient” in connecting poverty, corruption and crime, on 
the one hand, and, in discouraging legal business on the other. Research of the rela-
tion between “gray economy” and corruption has shown that “gray economy” gen-
erates corruption to a higher degree, rather than vice versa. (Buehn and Schneider, 
2009: 27). Th is is especially obvious in BiH. Corruption has become a sort of taxation 
of the “gray economy” (Tomaš, 2010: 131).
3.2.9. Ineffi  cient macroeconomic policy
In BiH, a uniform and coordinated macroeconomic policy does not exist. Some 
international institutions, such as the IMF or the WB, have a greater infl uence on the 
macroeconomic policy than domestic authorities. Partly, macroeconomic policy is 
implemented by the authorities of the entities. However, suffi  cient and effi  cient co-
ordination does not exist. Furthermore, international institutions frequently initiate 
and conduct the needed coordination of policies among and between the authorities 
of the entities. 
4. HOW TO IMPROVE TRANSITION IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA
By establishing two entities and by introducing the equality of the three na-
tions, the Dayton Accord established peace in BiH. Also, possibility was left  for all 
issues not regulated by the Dayton Accord to be agreed upon by the entities through 
BiH’s institutions. From this aspect, BiH should be capable of creating an institution-
al framework that is ready to be used in solving any problem it encounters. However, 
the experience of the past 16 years has shown that the mechanism has functioned in 
a rather limited manner, and had an impact on slow and ineffi  cient transition. Unsat-
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isfactory results of the transition, diffi  cult socio-economic conditions, political insta-
bility, corruption, weak rule of law, moral hazard in the behavior of politicians, moral 
hazard in state-owned institutions’ spending and a series of negative phenomena in 
the postwar functioning of BiH – these are the factors that repeatedly showed that it 
was necessary to search for solutions that would change the existing situation.
4.1. Political and institutional presumptions
4.1.1. Political consensus about the future of BiH
Th e experience in the implementation of the Dayton Accord in the past 17 
years has demonstrated that the past is a burden when expanding the institutional 
framework for effi  cient transition. Th e future requires peace as the starting point, as 
the highest of all BiH values. Th e Dayton Accord should not be discarded; on the con-
trary, its strength should be used to shape the future. It is not an ideal peace accord. 
However, it is the most what BiH can accept in order to live in peace. Th e Dayton Ac-
cord is the foundation of the existence of today’s BiH and its entities, i.e. the compro-
mise which reconciled contradictions between the nations and enabled them to live 
in peace. Without the political platform established by the Dayton Accord, BiH would 
not be sustainable. Th e consensus should not be changed. It is necessary to establish 
a consensus about the future and about the way to create an institutional framework 
which will encourage economic and democratic development.
Th e political consensus about the future should be an expression of the en-
tities’, nations’ and citizens’ will, i.e. their vision of their own future in BiH. Th e 
consensus must arise from BiH’s entities’, nations’ and citizens’ honest and direct 
acceptance of each other the way they are, and not the way they are imagined by in-
ternational institutions. Every consensus in BiH in the past 17 years has been reached 
through direct intermediation by international institutions, or has been initiated by 
them. It is necessary that a political consensus about the future be established without 
the intermediation of the international community. Th e consensus should represent 
the set of common interests that provide security, dignity and prosperity for all. Such 
an approach exists in BiH. However, it should be recognized and formulated. If BiH, 
its entities and nations currently posses clearly formulated common interests with 
neighboring countries, with the European Union as well as other countries through-
out the world, it is logical that such interests must exist inside BiH as well. Th e mutual 
respect of nations and the entities in conditions of equality- the Dayton Accord - is 
the starting point for formulating common interests in the future. Reaching a po-
litical consensus about the future should begin with domestic politicians taking full 
and complete responsibility for overall conditions and development of the country 
as well as with the international community’s readiness to relinquish responsibility 
and hand it over to them. In BiH, a semi-protectorate of the international community 
still exists. According to some authors, this was an understandable postwar response 
to the insupportable conditions of confl ict (Fischer, 2006: 446), but which could be 
unlimited regarding its duration and competences (Ehrke 2003:126).
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BiH can claim with certainty that the nations and citizens of BiH want a Eu-
ropean future. Th eir perception of their belonging to the European community of 
nations is an extremely valuable fact for creating a more advanced future for BiH: 
the basic direction to follow is already known 19. Th is fact is the focus of decisions 
on the future of BiH and the prosperity of its nations and citizens on the territory of 
BiH. Th e European way of life, European standards regarding the rights of nations 
and citizens must be created in BiH, they must be an expression of awareness, will 
and desire to reach them. It is in one’s own country that one becomes a citizen of Eu-
rope. BiH should become a territory where rights and freedoms we aspire to through 
European integrations are really achieved. Th e strengthening of the economy is the 
precondition of all rights and freedoms. Th erefore, the establishment of a more effi  -
cient economic system in BiH is an inevitable topic to be discussed when remodeling 
the future of BiH. 
A political consensus about the future of BiH should clearly defi ne the position 
of the nations and citizens, the political structure and regulation of BiH, institutions, 
the hierarchy of institutions, institutions’ competences and the way of governing and 
protecting the rights and freedom of the nations and citizens. BiH should be defi ned 
as a decentralized democratic country. Th e hierarchy of institutions and sharing pow-
ers between diff erent levels of government should be regulated so that each level of 
government has the needed level of functionality. It should be clear from the political 
platform that the responsibility for the future of the country depends on nations and 
citizens, i.e. their democratically elected representatives. Th e role of the international 
community should be reduced to an ordinary level as the one present in all other 
internationally recognized countries. A political consensus about the future would 
signify the end of the international protectorate in BiH.
Th e attitude towards changing the Constitution should also be an integral part 
of the political consensus about the future of BiH. Aft er reaching a political consen-
sus about the future, changing the Constitution would be a technical issue. Th e new 
Constitution should defi ne rather precisely the division of competences between in-
stitutions of diff erent levels of government. Institutions would have to be professional, 
transparent, rationally organized and serve the citizens. Democratically elected rep-
resentatives of the nations and citizens should shape the institutions and establish 
their operations in compliance with the Constitution and laws. 
By reaching a political consensus about the future of BiH and changes of the 
Constitution in compliance with determinants of the future, some very signifi cant 
limitations in the functioning of the entire system would be overcome: (a) politi-
cal stability of BiH would be increased; (b) professional functioning of institutions 
would be established; (c) the allocation of competences in exercising authority would 
19 In BiH, there is not a single serious political party whose program opposes the accession of BiH to the 
European Union. To tell the truth, there are attitudes in political circles according to which “membership 
in the European Union should not be accepted at all costs”. Th ey are usually pointed out when there is 
disagreement over initiatives for changing the political structure of BiH (for example, ideas about abolish-
ing the entity-based system of BiH).
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be defi ned and clear; (d) a better public image of labor would be enabled and citizens’ 
oversight and control of the work of institutions would be increased; (e) disproportion 
between necessary reforms and the development of functionality of the institutions 
would be reduced, and this would speed up reforms and increase their effi  ciency.
4.1.2. New economic system
Political consensus about the future and changes in the regulatory framework 
based on a new political platform should enable the establishment of a new economic 
system. Th e bases of a new economic system would also have to fi nd their place in a 
political platform about the future of BiH and in the new Constitution. Th ey should 
then be elaborated in legislation and institutions should be established to implement 
them. Th e new economic system in BiH should be based on:
4.1.3. Freedom of entrepreneurship 
Precisely because of its political specifi city, the economy of BiH should rely 
more on free entrepreneurship and less on institutional entrepreneurship. In the long 
run, we should tend to establish an entrepreneurial society. Relations built on free 
entrepreneurship are founded on competition and objective regulations, thus off ering 
a lower degree of confl ict than is the case with state controlled entrepreneurship. BiH 
should institutionally encourage the freedom of entrepreneurship and design meth-
ods for it to verify, and also to develop the circumstances of taking business risks. 
4.1.4. Legal security of doing business
Th e rule of law in BiH must protect the conduct of business, i.e. ensure the free-
dom of entering into business relations as well as the obligation of executing contractual 
obligations. Failure to execute obligations must be very risky and consequences for fail-
ure to do so should have far-reaching consequences for business operations and assets 
of an enterprise. It is impermissible, as is the case now, for the state to implement its “so-
cial policy” through failing to stick to contracts or tacitly tolerating it. In the long run, 
the absence of the rule of law in business leads to the collapse of the economy. Loan-tak-
ers terrorizing creditors and slow and inconsistent administration of justice discourage 
serious investors who would like to set up long-term business activity in BiH, and lead 
the country to even more corruption and to the collapse of its economy. 
4.1.5. Uniform economic area 
Even the existing Constitution of BiH indicates a uniform area, although it 
is imprecisely determined which measures and instruments are used to ensure it. 
Th rough a series of laws at diff erent levels of the legislature, full freedom of exchange 
of goods, investment of capital, employment, and service provision should be ensured 
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in the entire territory of BiH. It also indicates that there are economic subsystems 
whose functioning ensures the uniformity of the economic area. Th e following must 
be uniform: currency, monetary policy, import regime, export regime, protection of 
competition etc.
4.1.6. Uniform system of macroeconomic coordination 
Th e existence of a uniform economic area also suggests uniform macroeco-
nomic coordination and macroeconomic policy. Th ere is also the need to synchro-
nize policies used to achieve goals in diff erent sectors. It is not easy to reconcile all 
economic and political diff erences in BiH; however, this is the precondition for the 
effi  cient functioning of the economic system. Th erefore, an institutional framework 
of macroeconomic coordination needs to be established. Its functioning would be 
founded on the affi  rmation of advantages such coordination brings to the economy of 
BiH, and not on a centralized concept of managing the economy. 
4.1.7. Synchronized economic policy 
Th e future BiH should be a decentralized country. According to the current 
balance of political forces in BiH, a political consensus about the future of BiH and a 
new Constitution based on it could probably be based on a federal state structure with 
a clear demarcation of competences among institutions on diff erent levels of govern-
ment. In such circumstances, conducting the economic policy at diff erent levels of 
government would be possible. In order to achieve common macroeconomic goals, 
mechanisms of synchronization of the economic policy should be established accord-
ing to sectoral and institutional principles.    
New administrative and economic institutions, established on the basis of a po-
litical consensus about the future and the new Constitution, should initiate a new cycle 
of economic reforms. Th e economic eff ects of those reforms will confi rm the effi  ciency 
or the ineffi  ciency of constitutional and systemic changes. Reforms within the new eco-
nomic system should lead to changed fl ows of resources in the economic area of BiH, 
as well as to the establishment of true competition, the elimination of voluntarism and 
its infl uence on the economy, to the collapse of “bandit capitalism” and to the estab-
lishment of new relative price relations based on more competitiveness. Changes in the 
economic system should also reveal the unproductivity of some of the current solutions 
applied to the economic system, and how much time and money has been spent on 
quasi reforms that have produced very poor results or no results at all. Th is could be a 
good reason for the public and investors to support a new economic concept. 
5. CONCLUSION
Th e war in BiH ended when consensus was reached under the auspices of the 
international community, and not when the warring sides understood that peace was 
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a better option. Th e transition process was discouraged because of this during the en-
tire postwar period, since neither side was fully satisfi ed with the Dayton Accord and 
there were frequent attempts to achieve the war goals in peacetime by other means. 
Th rough the Dayton Accord, BiH was created as a decentralized state. Th is was 
supposed to be a starting point for the creation of effi  cient mechanisms of coordina-
tion and cooperation between diff erent levels of government, in order to enable the 
realization of common development goals. BiH has serious problems in coordinating 
policies among diff erent levels of government and in creating a market based economy 
of the state. Institutions on diff erent levels of government in BiH are not character-
ized by a high level of effi  ciency. Th ey slowly change the characteristics of the system, 
insuffi  ciently protect the rights of citizens and of the business community, they do 
not provide quality public service and they spend a large portion of the GDP on their 
functioning. Common institutions have no general power. Not many common goals 
have been created there. Th ey have not become a factor leading to the integration of 
the country, nor have they started development. Reduction in international economic 
aid, worsened conditions of borrowing abroad and the economic crisis have enhanced 
the political destabilization of BiH. It is increasingly obvious that the country’s eco-
nomic decline can endanger peace as well.
Because of generous international economic aid and bad shape of the domestic 
economy, BiH has become economically dependent on the international community. 
When the economic, social and political conditions in BiH are concerned, no one has 
taken full responsibility for them. Th e system of responsibility is partially regulated 
without clear and functional coordination. Th erefore, democratic institutions could 
not have functioned at their full capacity. Even 17 years since the establishment of 
peace in BiH, the country has remained a divided society with an undefi ned inte-
grative power. Expectations that the international community will opt for one side, 
or even make the fi nal decision, encourage the development of damaging strategies 
that do not lead to the establishment of trust and an authentic consensus inside the 
country. 
Although this analysis has demonstrated the fact that the international com-
munity’s formula “democratization + market economy = peace” has not become fully 
functional in postwar BiH, it cannot be claimed that it is wrong. To be honest, there 
are serious problems with regard to both democracy and market economy. However, 
peace continues to be preserved. In BiH today, there is more democracy and more 
market economy than ever before. However, the power of democratic and market 
institutions is weaker than the power needed for changing relations in the society 
and reinforcing the economy. Th is analysis has identifi ed two specifi c forms of moral 
hazard in BiH: (1) important role of the international community in all processes, as 
well the encouragement of the allegiance of domestic authorities to the international 
community which weakens the responsibility of the authorities towards those who 
have elected them and (2) spending of public administration in BiH is independent of 
economic conditions in the country. Democratization usually suggests transparency 
and a high level of responsibility, while market economy indicates taking economic 
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risks for reached decisions. In the postwar years, a lot has been done with regard to 
democratization and economic reform. However, not a single process has been com-
pleted: the allegiance to the international community and the acknowledgement of its 
political superiority in BiH has replaced democratic responsibility and, corruption, 
crime, the gray economy and voluntarism have fl ourished. In such conditions, transi-
tion in BiH could not have been more successful either. By eliminating moral hazard 
from the behavior of the authorities, interest in societal relations would be reinforced 
and motivation for a dialogue on contradictions would be improved. Th ere are two 
possibilities that can result from such a dialogue: a consensus could be reached about 
the future of BiH - a consensus about the possibility or impossibility of the existence 
of BiH. No matter which consensus would be established, it would be a realistic pic-
ture of BiH as a product of real political, national, religious, social and economic rela-
tions. A consensus about the future could very quickly initiate changes and accelerate 
transition. Although BiH is burdened with a series of contradictions, a consensus 
about the future is still more probable than the disintegration of BiH. It is time for the 
international community to understand this and give domestic politicians a chance. 
Otherwise, the economic and social conditions in the country could destabilize the 
country relatively quickly and threaten the survival of everything that has so far been 
achieved during transition. 
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UZROCI USPORENE I NEEFIKASNE TRANZICIJE 
EKONOMIJE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE 
I MOGUĆNOSTI NJENOG POBOLJŠANJA
Rajko Tomaš 20
Sažetak
U ovom radu istražujemo uzroke usporene i neefi kasne tranzicije u BiH, te mo-
gućnosti njenog poboljšanja. Najsnažnija integrativna snaga BiH u proteklih sedamna-
est godina bila je medjunarodna zajednica. Iako se vjerovalo da će demokratizacija i 
tržišna ekonomija ojačati mir, tržište nije uspjelo apsorbovati resurse i obezbijediti eko-
nomsku samoodrživost, a demokratija nije uspostavila institucije po mjeri ekonomskih, 
socijalnih i političkih problema u BiH. Time je osnovni koncept tranzicije, postavljen 
od strane medjunarodne zajednice, doživio neuspjeh. Medjunarodna zajednica treba 
pokazati spremnost da prepusti odgovornost za stanje u BiH domaćim političarima. Tek 
potpunim preuzimanjem odgovornosti, domaći političari mogu spoznati sve prednosti i 
sve mane odnosa u BiH uspostavljenih Dejtonskim sporazumom i uspostaviti potrebni 
politički konsenzus o budućnosti BiH. Taj konsenzus je nužna pretpostavka za funkcio-
nalnost BiH, promjenu Ustava, uspostavljanje novog ekonomskog sistema, provodjenje 
novog kruga ekonomskih reformi i ubrzavanje tranzicije. 
Ključne riječi: tranzicija, tržišna ekonomija, demokratizacija, ekonomske refor-
me, novi ekonomski sistem.
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